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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Reasons for this Inquiry

2

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission was the latest of several
3
cases in which the Supreme Court has tested federal campaign
finance laws against the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Not discussed in Citizens United, however, is a more fundamental question: Does the Constitution’s scheme of enumerated
congressional powers grant Congress power to regulate political

1

2
3

Bibliographical Note: This footnote collects alphabetically the secondary sources cited
more than once in this Article. The sources and short form citations used are as follows:
ANNALS OF CONG. (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (multiple vols.), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.].
DETERMINATIONS OF THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, CONCERNING
ELECTIONS, AND ALL THEIR INCIDENTS (London 1774) [hereinafter DETERMINATIONS].
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill
Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (multiple vols. projected; not all completed) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (multiple vols.) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
THEODORE FOSTER’S MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION HELD AT SOUTH KINGSTON,
RHODE ISLAND, IN MARCH, 1790 (R.I. Historical Soc’y 1929) [hereinafter FOSTER’S
MINUTES].
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (multiple
vols.) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton et al.) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST].
GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010)
[hereinafter LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS].
Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469 (2003) [hereinafter Natelson, Enumerated].
Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Founders’ Hermeneutic].
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937 &
Supp. 1987) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS and FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT, respectively].
THE REMEMBRANCER; OR, IMPARTIAL REPOSITORY OF PUBLIC EVENTS (London 1775–
84) (multiple vols.) [hereinafter THE REMEMBRANCER].
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (largely sustaining campaign
finance laws); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (partly sustaining campaign finance
laws); cf. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 120–24 (1948) (finding it
unnecessary to reach First Amendment issues, but sustaining the holding of the lower
court, which had invalidated an early federal campaign law on First Amendment
grounds).
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campaigns at all? If not, such regulations are, of course, invalid, and
4
it is unnecessary to consider First Amendment issues.
The reputed basis for federal authority over congressional campaigns is the enumerated power granted by Article I, Section 4,
5
6
Clause 1 and its incidents under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The modern Supreme Court sometimes calls Article I, Section 4,
7
Clause 1 the “Elections Clause,” but it is more accurately called the
“Times, Places and Manner Clause,” since it is only one of many con8
stitutional provisions governing elections.
In this Article, I report on my investigation into the scope of congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause, according to its original understanding and meaning. I designed this
investigation to be objective; in other words, unlike much constitutional writing, this is not a brief for or against particular laws, propos9
als, or modes of interpretation.

4

5

6

7
8

9

But see Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545–46 (1934) (recognizing, in an opinion by Justice Sutherland, an apparently extra-constitutional power in Congress to regulate presidential elections). The Burroughs reasoning bears some similarity to the more
famous Sutherland “inherent sovereign authority” opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1936). However, the doctrine of extra-constitutional
powers in the federal government is contradicted by the wording of the Tenth Amendment. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89–90 (1907).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”).
Id. § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
E.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134.
There are at least eleven other “elections clauses.” See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2, 3
(describing the procedure for presidential elections); id. amend. XII (revising that procedure); id. amend. XV, § 1 (preventing discrimination in voting based on “race, color, or
previous condition of servitude”); id. amend. XVII (providing for direct election of U.S.
Senators); id. amend. XIX (preventing discrimination in voting based on sex); id. amend.
XX (term-limiting the President); id. amend. XXIII, § 1 (allowing electors in the District
of Columbia to vote for presidential electors); id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (banning discrimination in voting based on payment of tax); id. amend. XXV, § 2 (providing for election of a
Vice President to fill a vacancy); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 (limiting age discrimination in voting). As made clear later in the text, constitutional provisions governing qualifications
for and terms of office may be added to the list. E.g., id. art. I, § 2, cls. 1–3 (providing for
qualifications of electors and members of the House of Representatives and for allocation
of Representatives among states).
On the defects in “originalist” writings caused by the desire of legal writers to argue a
cause rather than engage in honest historical investigation, see Henry P. Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 377–78 (1981).
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B. Text and Post-Founding History
The text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause is as follows:
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regula10
tions, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”

As this provision seems to contemplate, historically the states have
been the chief regulators of congressional elections. Yet Congress
has intervened on important occasions. The first time was in 1842,
when Congress mandated that states electing more than one member
of the House of Representatives do so by districts rather than at11
large. Congress enacted other regulatory statutes during the Recon12
13
struction Era and at various points during the twentieth century.
14
The most recent interventions are the Help America Vote Act and
15
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, both adopted in 2002. The
16
last was partially invalidated by Citizens United. With few exceptions,
the purported basis for these statutes was the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
Although the Supreme Court has heard several challenges to
17
these statutes, it never has examined thoroughly the intended scope

10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
1842 Apportionment Act, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491.
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Force Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
E.g., Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43
Stat. 1070 (1925) (adopted in its initial form in 1910 as 36 Stat. 822); Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107
Stat. 77 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006)).
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended
in 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2006)).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
The Reconstruction Era laws, see sources cited supra note 12, were adopted wholly or entirely under the powers given Congress by the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. United States v.
Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930), sustained the application to federal employees of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070, as justified by congressional implied powers over
federal employees. It declined to reach the issue of whether the Act was within the scope
of the Times, Places and Manner Clause. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. at 396.
E.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921); United States v. Gradwell, 243
U.S. 476 (1917); Ex parte Yarbrough (Ku-Klux Cases), 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States
v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879); Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371 (1879).
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of the congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner
Clause. Some of the Court’s pronouncements have asserted exten18
Others
sive congressional power without citing much authority.
have asserted extensive congressional power while relying only on
19
cases that themselves cited little authority. Occasionally, the Court
has derived conclusions about eighteenth-century understanding
from fragmentary evidence of scant probative value, as when it relied
on the definition of “election” appearing in a nineteenth-century dic20
tionary.
21
In only one case, Newberry v. United States, a 1921 decision written
by Justice McReynolds, has the Court made some effort to reconstruct
the Founding-Era record—and the results were distinctly different
22
from the results of the Court’s other cases. The issue in Newberry was
whether the Times, Places and Manner Clause was broad enough to
authorize Congress to regulate primary elections as well as general
elections. The Court concluded that the power was not sufficiently
broad. Justice Pitney, writing for himself and two colleagues, dissented from that part of the opinion; but as has been true of other
justices taking an expansive view of the Clause, he cited little Found23
ing-Era material. When the Court overruled Newberry two decades
later, it relied on Pitney’s Newberry opinion, citing no additional
24
Founding-Era evidence.
Not even the Newberry Court’s survey of the evidence was particularly thorough. For example, the Court did not discuss eighteenth-

18

19

20
21
22
23

24

The treatment of Founding-Era understanding in Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 660–61, was
summary, as was that in Classic, 313 U.S. at 317–18. Other cases construing or applying
the Times, Places and Manner Clause have not examined the Founding-Era understanding at all. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93; Siebold, 100 U.S. at 371.
E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 n.16 (citing cases); Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366–67 (citing cases,
some not relevant); Gradwell, 243 U.S. at 482 (citing cases); Gale, 109 U.S. at 66 (citing
cases).
Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997).
256 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 250–51, 255–56.
However, he did deal briefly with some of the majority’s arguments based on the Federalist Papers. Id. at 283–91 (discussing The Federalist No. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 1).
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The Court in Classic actually said it was unnecessary to overrule Newberry because Justice McReynold’s decision spoke for only four
justices. Id. at 317. However, Justice McKenna (the fifth vote) had concurred with the
portion of the opinion construing the original meaning of the Times, Places and Manner
Clause, so it really was an overruling. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 258. Justice Stone’s opinion
for the Court in Classic promised a review of “the words of the Constitution read in their
historical setting as revealing the purpose of its framers,” but failed to deliver. Classic, 313
U.S. at 317.
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century election laws, understandings, or practices. Moreover, as ex25
plained below, the Newberry conclusion was erroneous.
Scholarly commentary on the original understanding or original
meaning of the Times, Places and Manner Clause has been brief and
usually has marshaled Founding-Era sources primarily to serve a larger argument. The most complete examination, by Professor Stephen
J. Safranek, appeared in an article contending for the constitutionali26
ty of a Colorado term-limits initiative. Professor Safranek relied on
the ratification-era debates to conclude that the Constitution’s reservation to the states of power to regulate the “manner” of elections was
broad enough to justify application of the term-limits initiative to
27
congressional candidates. Similarly, a student author used the same
sort of material to construct a case for the constitutionality of the Na28
tional Voter Registration Act. Although neither of those treatments
29
was truly comprehensive, others have been even briefer.
C. The Interpretive Method Employed in this Article and the Evidence of
Original Public Meaning
In order to recreate the original force of the Times, Places and
Manner Clause, one must take account of maxims of textual interpre25
26
27

28

29

Infra note 209 and accompanying text.
Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 321, 327–43 (1993).
The analysis would seem unnecessary since the Tenth Amendment reserves all undelegated power to the states and people; hence, state regulations, unlike congressional regulations, should not be confined by the constitutional meaning of “Manner of holding
Elections.” Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”). There is no requirement that states actually have been exercising a
power (in this case, control over federal elections) at the time the Tenth Amendment was
adopted for that power to be reserved; otherwise, any police power unexercisable in 1791
(e.g., regulation of automobiles) could not be exercised today. Nevertheless, current Supreme Court doctrine is that the “grant” to states by the Times, Places and Manner
Clause is their exclusive source of authority over federal elections. See, e.g., Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523–24 (2001) (following
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)); cf. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 281 (Pitney,
J., concurring in part).
Kevin K. Green, Note, A Vote Properly Cast? The Constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIS. 45, 51–60 (1996) (discussing National Voter Registration Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg
(2006)).
E.g., Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 289–90 (1989) (citing the Clause in arguing how the Founders’ designed the
Constitution to respond to social change); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1750–51 (2002); Anthony Peacock, Election Regulations, in
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 71–73 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005).
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tation current in the eighteenth century. Modern commentators
tend to be skeptical of such maxims, but in the Founding Era, judi30
cially-approved rules of construction enjoyed great standing.
Among the most important of the interpretive rules was that textual uncertainties in a document (including a constitution) should be
31
resolved in accordance with “the intent of the makers.” In the constitutional context, the “makers” were the ratifiers, and their “intent”
32
was their subjective understanding. If the subjective understanding
(which I refer to in this Article as original understanding) was either
not recoverable or not coherent, then one marshaled available evidence to infer an objective substitute for subjective intent—a con33
struct modern writers call the original public meaning. The original
public meaning is defined as how the text “would have been unders34
tood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader”
at the time of ratification.
A person employing the Founding-Era interpretive method may
begin either with evidence of original understanding, filling any gaps
with evidence of public meaning, or with evidence of public meaning,
amending it with any inconsistent understandings. The ultimate result of the inquiry should be the same using either method. In my
investigation, I began by seeking evidence of original public meaning.
For the Times, Places and Manner Clause, that evidence encompasses:
 Contemporaneous writings referencing the “manner” of elections;
 British parliamentary statutes regulating the times, places, and manner of elections (as former British subjects knowledgeable in the law

30

31
32
33
34

1 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (1772) (“Maxims . . . are of
the same Strength as Acts of Parliament when once the Judges have determined what is a
Maxim . . . .”); accord State v. ____, 2 N.C. 28, 1794 WL 87 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1794).
Natelson, Founders’ Hermeneutic, supra note 1, at 1249–55.
Id. at 1288–89 (citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted), 1297–03.
Id. at 1286.
See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (“[H]ow the words and phrases, and
structure (and sometimes even the punctuation marks!) would have been understood by
a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and phrases, in
context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and linguistic community
in which they were adopted. . . . We call this approach original, objective-public-meaning textualism.” (citations omitted)). Kesavan and Paulsen offer this definition as part of the
common argument that constitutional interpretation should be guided by original meaning textualism rather than by original intent of the drafters or original understanding of
the ratifiers. After Kesavan and Paulsen wrote, however, I undertook a review of eighteenth-century interpretive method that left little doubt that the Founders granted original understanding (when coherent and available) primacy over original meaning. See
generally Natelson, Founders’ Hermeneutic, supra note 1.
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of the British Empire, the Founders were familiar with British election
35
laws and discussed them during the ratification controversy);
 Provisions in contemporaneous state constitutions regulating the
times, place, and manner of elections;
 Early state statutes designed to comply with the mandate of the Times,
Places and Manner Clause. This category includes only statutes (a)
adopted by states that already had ratified the Constitution (b) during
the period before all the original thirteen had ratified—i.e., before
Rhode Island’s ratification on May 29, 1790; and
 The drafting, text, and structure of the Constitution.

After collecting evidence of original public meaning, I then
turned to the ratification record to determine if the ratifiers adopted
any special understandings inconsistent with the original public
meaning. I concluded that the ratifiers’ understanding did not differ
from the original public meaning, except in one particular: The
conventions of several states ratified only after being assured—and in
some cases stating the understanding explicitly—that congressional
power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause would be construed narrowly.
II. THE “MANNER OF ELECTION” IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
A. Documents Referenced
Eighteenth-century English-language writings contain many occurrences of the phrase “manner of election,” and some occurrences
36
of its synonym, “mode of election.” A Gale Company database, Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, contains a fairly good sample of these,
although I found numerous instances elsewhere as well. My conclusions of original meaning were based on documents that (1) referred
to the “manner” or “mode” of election, (2) offered illustrations of
what the phrase meant, (3) were prepared prior to May 29, 1790, the
35

36

For example, participants in the ratification debates often referred to an incident in
which Parliament had lengthened terms in the House of Commons from three to seven
years. E.g., Agrippa, Letter XIII, MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 770 (referring to “the usurpation by which they continued
themselves from three to seven years”).
For references to the “mode of election,” see, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 52
(reporting remarks by Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina ratifying convention);
FOSTER’S MINUTES, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting John Sayles at the first sitting of the
Rhode Island ratifying convention as using “Mode of Election” when discussing the
Times, Places and Manner Clause); and Ordinance of the Convention of New-York, for
Settling the New Form of Government of that State (May 8, 1777), in THE
REMEMBRANCER, supra note 1, at 238, 240. See also infra notes 66 & 69; cf. FOSTER’S
MINUTES, supra note 1, at 88 (referring to the “Mode of Putting the Vote”).
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day Rhode Island became the thirteenth state to ratify the Constitution, and (4) were prepared within the geographic limits of what had
been Great Britain’s Atlantic empire—that is, England, Scotland,
Ireland, and (before 1776) British North America. Some of the documents are discussed in the text below while others are referenced
only in footnotes.
B. Documents from England, Scotland, and Ireland
37

The Royal Charter of the Dublin Society stated that the Society’s
“manner of election” included time limits, qualifications, and a pro38
cedure for selecting a voting place. William Coxe’s English work,
39
Sketches of the Natural, Civil, and Political State of Swisserland [sic] described “[t]he manner of election” for office in a Swiss canton as involving popular election of five candidates, and choice of a final victor from them by lot. Similarly, Philip Morant described the “manner
of election” of an English mayor as involving an election by the burgesses, “or the major part of them, in common Hall assembled [who]
nominated and returned two Aldermen to the bench of Aldermen:
who, retiring into the Council, or Record-room, chose one of the two
40
to be Mayor for the year ensuing.” Rules pertaining to the “manner
of election” in London prescribed the election of candidates from
districts, the qualifications of the electorate, the choice of candidate,
41
and methods of certification. A History of Great Yarmouth described

37
38

39

40
41

The Royal Charter of the Dublin Society (1785).
Id. at 5, 7, 9 (providing for “such others as shall from Time to Time be elected in the
Manner herein after directed,” and stating that the aforesaid “Manner” was that the
members designated “within forty Days next after the Date of this our Grant, to meet together at such Time and Place . . . to the said Members, or such of them as live within our
City, or Liberties of our City of Dublin . . . where they, or the major Part of them then
present, may nominate, elect and chuse [sic] new Members” and “that the said Corporation, or any seven or more of them, whereof the President, or one of the Vice-Presidents,
to be one, shall have full Power to elect such Persons to be Members of the said Society”).
WILLIAM COXE, SKETCHES OF THE NATURAL, CIVIL, AND POLITICAL STATE OF SWISSERLAND
54 (1779) (referring to election in a Swiss canton); see also AEOLUS: OR, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICIAN 30 (1770) (stating, “Plutarch goes on—‘The manner of
their Election was as follows[]’” and further stating that the people were called together,
locked together in a room so they could not see outside, and generally decided according
to shouts of the people); REV. T. WILSON, AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 234 (1783)
(stating that “the manner of their election” was drawing by lots from a particular body).
1 PHILIP MORANT, THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE COUNTY OF ESSEX 98 (London,
1768).
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS, RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND PRIVILEGES, OF THE CITY OF LONDON 39–
40 (1779) (“[T]he manner of which election has several times varied: but in the year
1714 . . . it was enacted, that . . . there shall be chosen only one citizen by the inhabitants
of every ward destitute of an alderman, and the person so elected to be returned by the
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the “[m]anner of electing, sending, and receiving the Port Bailiffs” as
involving an election in June or July by the common assemblies of the
particular towns whose turn it was to send [the Port Bailiffs],” followed by presentation
to the general assembly of the Cinque Ports, and the towns of Rye
and Winchelsea, on Tuesday after the feast of St. Margaret, to be by
them approved, acknowledged, confirmed, and deputed . . . . And
if any objection appeared to either of the persons elected, an order
42
was given for another to be elected in his stead.

To a considerable extent, Parliament had standardized regulations for the “manner of election” to the House of Commons. Parliamentary legislation governing the choice of burgesses prescribed
public notice and proclamations, times and places of voting, the
identity, duties, and oaths of the supervising officers, viva voce voting
(alterable to secret ballot if the assembled voters requested it), generation and retention of a list of qualified and disqualified voters, adjudication of disputed elections, and punishment for selling one’s
43
vote. The “Manner of the Election of Knights” to the Commons also
included provisions for the forms and substance of writs, proclama44
tions, times, and for a written and sealed ballot.

42
43

44

lord mayor (or other returning officer, duly qualified to hold a court of wardmore) to the
court of lord-mayor and aldermen, by whom the person so returned is to be admitted,
and sworn into the office of alderman.”); see also CHARLES BURLINGTON ET AL, THE
MODERN UNIVERSAL BRITISH TRAVELLER [sic] 264 (1779) (stating that the Lord-Mayor of
London “is elected in the following manner” and that the livery chose two aldermen, the
body of aldermen selected one from them, the chancellor gave his approval, and the designee was sworn in).
THE HISTORY OF GREAT YARMOUTH 269–70 (1776).
E.g., DETERMINATIONS, supra note 1, at 42–79; see also 4 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 330–32, 557 (1780) (indexing the “Manner of Election” for Burgesses
in Parliament to include proclamation, voting in person, sheriff as officer in charge,
hours of voting, time of voting, place of voting, voting either “by Hearing of the Voices, or
View of the Hands held up” provision for a poll (secret ballot), appointment and duties
of clerk, swearing of clerks, naming of inspectors, timely process, delivery of a copy of the
poll to anyone who desired and paid for it, delivery of “check-books” to the clerk of the
peace, erection of polling booths, and the requirement that the sheriff list the towns from
which each booth was appointed and deliver a copy of the list to any candidate on request); A GENTLEMAN OF THE INNER-TEMPLE, LAWS CONCERNING THE ELECTION OF
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 84 (1774) (reporting that the “Manner of Election” referred to
the Sheriff receiving an election writ and directing election of commissioners, who then
chose representatives in Parliament).
1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE 469–70 (1768–70) (mentioning and giving, in 8 Hen. IV, c.
XV, “The Manner of the Election of Knights of Shires for a Parliament,” the form of the
writ, proclamation of day and place of Parliament and of election of knights, free election
of the full county, and the names of persons chosen to be written in an indenture under
seals of those who chose them).
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This standardization was not complete, however. The “manner of
election” to the Commons varied somewhat according to locale.
John Impey’s treatise The Office of Sheriff explained that in Scotland
also the “manner” included provision for writs of election, oaths administered to electors, designation of the sheriff as the officer who
gave notice of the time of election, the meeting of freeholderelectors, returns of elections, and punishment for defaulting offi45
cials. Scotland differed from England in that the Scottish “manner
of election” to the House of Commons often was indirect—that is, the
voters chose “commissioners” who actually elected the Member of
46
47
Parliament. The “manner of election” varied in Ireland as well.
These English, Scottish, and Irish sources used the phrase “manner of election” to encompass the times, places, and mechanics of
voting; legislative districting; provisions for registration lists; the qualifications of electors and elected; strictures against election-day misconduct; and the rules of decision (majority, plurality, or lot). “Manner of election” included regulation of elections decided in two tiers,
as when one group chose electors and the electors chose the winner,
or when a group selected several candidates and the winner was chosen by lot. However, regulations of the “manner of election” in these
documents seem not to have included governance of campaigns.
C. “Manner of Election” in America
Americans ascribed the same general content to the phrase
“manner of election” as the English, Irish, and Scots did. The Transactions of Benjamin Franklin’s American Philosophical Society provided for the “manner of . . . election” of officers, and for the time
and place of election, notice to electors one week before the election,
45

46
47

JOHN IMPEY, THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF 303–10 (1786); see also GEORGE CHALMERS, THE
HISTORY OF THE UNION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 498 (1786) (describing proceedings of Scottish Parliament on Jan. 29, 1707, as determining the “manner in which
the burrows shall elect their representatives to the House of Commons of Great Britain”
to include districting for election of Scots representatives); DETERMINATIONS, supra note
1, at 82–84 (providing for “[t]he Manner of & Proceeding at the Election of the Commoners for Scotland” to include writs of election, precepts to boroughs to elect commissioners, punishment for defaulting sheriff, punishment for defaulting chief magistrate of
borough, summoning council of the borough, appointment of day for election, and prescribing two days between the date on which the time of election was appointed and the
actual election of commissioners and commissioners’ election of the member of Parliament).
Id.
9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, PASSED IN THE PARLIAMENTS HELD IN IRELAND 68 (1786) (statute passed in 1763, referring as the “same manner of election” a master gathering together a minimum number of voters and their election).
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choice of election judges, appointment of secretaries for recording
the names of voters, voting by ballot or written ticket rather than viva
48
voce, and for breaking tie votes by lot. A 1721 South Carolina election code described “the Manner and Form of electing Members” to
the lower house of the colonial assembly as including the qualifications of office-holders and the freedom of voters from civil process on
election days. Within the code also were provisions for writs of election, times for elections, oaths and enrollment of electors, the choice
of election managers and the conduct of voter assemblies (which
were to continue for no more than two days). Voting was by paper
ballot. Ballots were deposited in designated boxes, which were then
sealed. Double ballots were invalid. The winner was determined by a
majority rather than a plurality. The code specified punishment for
49
corrupt election officials and persons who disrupted elections.
Connecticut’s royal charter provided that there was to be “One
Governor, One Deputy-Governor, and Twelve Assistants, to be from
time to Time constituted, elected and chosen out of the Freemen of
the said Company for the Time being, in such Manner and Form as he50
reafter in these Presents is expressed.” The “Manner and Form” included meetings of the citizens on the second Thursday of October
and the second Thursday of May, and selection by majority votes of
two persons in each “Place, Town, or City” to serve in the General As48

49
50

2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY vi–vii (1786). For another
example of “manner” as including the method of balloting in a private organization, see
THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF MR. BAMPFYLDE-MOORE CAREW 48 (1786), describing an
imaginary “manner of election” by which the voter puts a white ball in the box designated
for his candidate and a black ball in the other candidates’ boxes.
S.C. STAT, 113–15 (1721) (“An Act to ascertain the Manner and Form of electing Members . . . in the Commons House of Assembly.”).
CHARTER OF CONN. 1662, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1,
at 530 (emphasis added). The charter stated as follows:
[T]here shall be One Governor, One Deputy-Governor, and Twelve Assistants, to
be from time to Time constituted, elected and chosen out of the Freemen of the
said Company for the Time being, in such Manner and Form as hereafter in these
Presents is expressed, . . . And further we . . . Do ordain and grant, That the Governor . . . shall and may from Time to Time upon all Occasions, give Order for the
assembling of the said Company, and calling them together to consult and advise
of the Business and Affairs of the said Company, and that for ever hereafter, twice
in every Year, That is to say, On every Second Thursday in October, and on every
Second Thursday in May, or oftener in case it shall be requisite; the Assistants, and
Freemen of the said Company, or such of them (not exceeding Two Persons from
each Place, Town, or City) who shall be from Time to Time hereunto elected or
deputed by the major Part of the Freemen of the respective Towns, Cities, and
Places for which they shall be elected or deputed, shall have a General Meeting or
Assembly . . . whereof the Governor of Deputy-Governor, and Six of the Assistants
at least, to be Seven, shall be called the General Assembly, and shall have full Power and authority to alter and change their Days and Times of Meeting .
Id. at 530–31.
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sembly, which in turn was to elect the governor. The charter of
Rhode Island prescribed “manner” regulations of the same general
51
kind.
After independence, Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to
operate under their charters, with some amendments. The other
states drafted new constitutions for themselves. Several of these constitutions explicitly regulated the “manner” of elections. The provisions governing “manner of election” varied in scope, although their
subject-matter was generally consistent. The Constitution of North
Carolina provided that the “manner” of election of delegates to the
Continental Congress would be for them to be “chosen annually by
the General Assembly, by ballot; but may be superseded [i.e., re52
placed in office], in the mean time, in the same manner.” Georgia’s
“manner” rules for selecting state representatives were as follows:
The manner of electing representatives shall be by ballot, and shall be
taken by two or more justices of the peace, in each county, who shall provide a convenient box for receiving the said ballots; and, on closing the
poll, the ballots shall be compared in public with the list of votes that
have been taken, and the majority immediately declared; a certificate of
the same being given to the persons elected, and also a certificate re53
turned to the house of representatives.

The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution described the “manner” by
mandating the time of election (annually, on the first Monday of
April), property and age qualifications of electors, a notice of elec54
tion, and who would serve as election judges. It also required that
the “Legislature shall, by standing laws, direct the time and manner
of convening the electors, and of collecting votes, and of certifying to
55
the Governor the officers elected.” The “manner” regulations in
56
57
Maryland’s constitution included voter qualifications, time and
58
59
frequency of elections, the identity of the election judges, viva voce
60
majority voting for senatorial electors, secret ballot plurality voting
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

CHARTER OF R.I. AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1663, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 3215.
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXVII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 2793.
GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 1, at 780.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. 1, § 2, arts. II, IV (setting forth manner of election for state
senators).
Id. ch. 2, § 1, art. X.
MD. CONST. of 1776.
Id. arts. II, IV, XII.
Id. arts. II, XIV (one and five years for different legislative houses).
Id. arts. VI, IX, XVII.
Id. art. XIV.
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62

among those electors for senators, and oaths for electors. The New
Hampshire constitution provided for election to the state council “in
the following manner,” and then specified how many council mem63
bers were to come from each county. The “manner” of electing the
governor of New Jersey was by a majority vote of a joint ballot of the
64
two legislative houses, with service for a one-year term. The constitutions of the other states all defined the manner of election in ways
65
consistent with the illustrations just given.
State election laws adopted after Independence employed “manner of election” and its variants in the same general way. The “mode
66
of holding elections” in a 1777 New York statute provided for public
notice at least ten days before election in each county for elections
for governor, lieutenant-governor, and senate. It specified the places
for election, the supervising officers and election judges, times of no61
62
63
64

65

66

Id. arts. XV, XVI.
Id. art. XVIII.
N.H. CONST. of 1776.
Article VII of The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provides:
VII. That the Council and Assembly jointly, at their first meeting after each annual election, shall, by a majority of votes, elect some fit person within the Colony,
to be Governor for one year, who shall be constant President of the Council, and
have a casting vote in their proceedings; and that the Council themselves shall
choose a Vice-President who shall act as such in the absence of the Governor.
N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. VII. Article XII provides:
XII. That the Judges of the Supreme Court shall continue in office for seven
years: the Judges of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas in the several counties,
Justices of the Peace, Clerks of the Supreme Court, Clerks of the Inferior Court of
Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions, the Attorney-General, and Provincial Secretary, shall continue in office for five years: and the Provincial Treasurer shall continue in office for one year; and that they shall be severally appointed by the
Council and Assembly, in manner aforesaid.
N.J. CONST. of 1776 art. XII (emphasis added).
DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 27 (specifying “manner” to include choice of election inspectors
and assessors and use of secret ballot); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. VI–VII, X, XII (prescribing “manner and form” of election by viva voce or by ballot; providing for “election of
senators . . . after this manner,” and dividing states into senatorial districts, proportioning
by census, electing by freeholders, and providing term limits); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19
(providing for “manner” and “mode” of electing supreme executive council: districting
the state and selection by ballot by freemen for particular terms); S.C. CONST. of 1778,
arts. XXVII–XXIX (including in “manner” of elections the choice by ballot, term of office
and identity of electors); S.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. II, III, XIII, XXI, XXVII (providing for
“manner” of election of legislative council, state president, and sheriffs, including selection by ballot, quorum, and qualification of electors); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, arts. VII,
X (similarly outlining “manner” of elections); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, §§ XVI, XVII,
XLIV (including in “manner” of elections the choice of two representatives from each
town, frequency of elections, ballot voting, sealing of ballots, vote counting, majority voting); VA. CONST. of 1776 (including in “manner” of elections legislative districting, qualifications of voters, returns by election officers, and terms of office).
Ordinance of the Convention of New-York, for Settling the New Form of Government of
that State (May 8, 1777), in THE REMEMBRANCER, supra note 1, at 238–43.
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tice, returns of poll lists, declaration of winner, and some voter quali67
fications.
A 1781 Maryland law mandated that certain special elections “be
held in county in manner and form following,” and prescribed the
time and place of election, the issuance of notice, the formalities pertaining to election officials, the administration of oaths, the announcement of the results, and that a plurality should determine the
68
victor. A 1787 New York statute prescribed as the “Mode of conducting every such Election,” the delivery of a paper ballot with the
names of the candidates, the voter’s receipt of the ballot in the presence of inspectors, the folding and closing of the ballot, its placement
in a box to be locked, who was to keep the key, inspection of the poll
lists, protection of ballot boxes, the disposition of voter challenges,
oaths to voters of questionable loyalty, the opening and counting of
ballots, the punishment of corrupt officials and of persons disrupting
69
an election, and the qualifications of voters. In this particular sta70
tute, the location of the voting was designated separately. States that
did not use the precise phrase “manner [or mode] of election”
71
adopted analogous measures.
By its terms, the Constitution was to come into effect upon ratifi72
cation by nine states. While the Constitution was still pending elsewhere, some of the ratifying states adopted statutes whose recited
purpose was to comply with the state’s duty under Article I, Section 4
73
to prescribe the times, places, and manner of election. The South
67
68

69
70
71

72
73

Id. at 241–42.
An Act for Holding Special Elections in Caecil County, 1781 Md. Laws, ch. IX; see also An
Act to Alter the Place of Holding the Elections for Members of the Legislature, and Parish Officers for the Parish of Saint John, Colleton County (Feb. 27, 1788), reprinted in
PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 440 (1790).
An Act for Regulating Elections (Feb. 13, 1787), § VI, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 27, 29–30 (1789).
Id.
See, e.g., An Act Concerning Election of Members of General Assembly (Dec. 20, 1785)
reprinted in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA 22–
26 (1790) (specifying qualifications of electors, a fine for failing to vote, privilege from
arrest for voters, secret polls if live voting was not practical, extension of voting up to four
days, resolution of conflicts, the oath for electors, the form of certification of election,
writs of election in the event an office was vacant, punishment for a disobedient sheriff,
and punishment for those who buy votes).
U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 1.
An Act for Prescribing on the Part of this State, the Times, Places, and Manner of Holding Elections for Representatives in the Congress, and the Manner of Appointing Electors
of a President of the United States (Nov. 4, 1788), reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 462 (1790); see also An Act Directing the Times, Places and Manner of Electing
Representatives in this State, for the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
United States of America (Jan. 27, 1789), 1789 N.Y. Laws, c. XI, reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE
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Carolina measure, for example, divided the state into five districts,
with one federal Representative to be elected by a plurality in each
district. The law also provided that the place of election was to be the
same as for the state house, and that the election was to be regulated
and conducted under the same rules. The law identified the conducting officials, specified how they were to make returns, and required examination of the returns by the governor. It provided for
proclamation of election, the deposit of original poll with the secretary of state, and a procedure in case the same person was elected in
more than one district. It further provided for the choice of presidential electors, to be appointed by legislature on the first Wednesday
of the following January, and required them to take an oath.
D. Summary of the Evidence on “Manner of Election”
The foregoing sources—British, Scottish, Irish, and American—all
used the phrase “manner of election” (or a close variant) and specified one or more components of that phrase. The sources tend to
supplement and reinforce rather than contradict each other. Considered in the aggregate, they suggest that regulating the “manner of
election” encompassed the following:
 Fixing the qualifications of the electors and of candidates;
 Setting the time of the election, including terms of office;
 Fixing the place of election, including description of district boundaries;
 Determining whether election was to be a single-tier or double-tier
process—i.e., whether voters decided the winner directly, or merely selected a class of people who either selected the ultimate winner or
from whom the ultimate winner was chosen by lot;
 Setting the rules for both tiers of a double-tier process;
 Determining whether the victor needed a majority or a plurality;
 Regulating the mechanics of voting, including provisions for notice,
returns, ballots or viva voce voting, and counting;

74

STATE OF NEW YORK 395 (1789). This law divided the state into six representative districts, provided that each elector was entitled to vote for one person, provided for signing
of poll lists, opening of election box, delivery to Sheriff, transmittal of box unopened to
Secretary of State, canvassing procedure, election by plurality, certification, an oath for
canvassers, dates of election, a vacancy procedure, penalties for bribery and corrupt conduct and for failure of administrator to perform his duty, no calling of militia during election or with twenty days before, and no service of civil process on elector on election day
or day preceding.
An Act for Prescribing on the Part of this State, the Times, Places, and Manner of holding
Elections for Representatives in the Congress, and the Manner of appointing Electors of a
President of the United States (Nov. 4, 1788), reprinted in PUBLIC LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 462, 463–63 (1790).
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 Erecting procedures to resolve election disputes; and
 Regulating Election Day behavior—e.g., providing for freedom for civil process and for punishment of Election Day misconduct.

With this background, we proceed to examine the electoral provisions the Framers actually drafted.
III. THE FRAMING AND LANGUAGE OF THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER
CLAUSE
A. Drafting History
Although the intent of the Constitution’s drafters—the Framers—
is not as authoritative as the original understanding and original pub75
lic meaning, their intent is useful evidence as to both since the Framers were part of the wider public and, in many cases, were influential ratifiers. This section, therefore, reviews the drafting history of the
Times, Places and Manner Clause.
After the Constitutional Convention achieved a quorum on May
25, 1787, it debated and adopted a series of resolutions designed to
76
serve as the basis for the new Constitution. On July 26, the tired
delegates adjourned for a ten-day recess, leaving behind them a
“Committee of Detail” to convert the resolutions into a draft constitution. The committee consisted of five members. One was Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts, a merchant who had been president of
Congress and was then chairman of the Convention’s Committee of
the Whole. The other four consisted of some of America’s most distinguished lawyers. One was the committee chairman, John Rutledge
of South Carolina, then serving as the state’s chancellor. The remaining three were Edmund Randolph of Virginia, then his state’s
governor and a former attorney general; James Wilson, one of Pennsylvania’s foremost legal practitioners; and Judge Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut.
If construed literally, one of the convention’s resolutions would
have bestowed almost unlimited authority on the new government: It
granted to Congress, in addition to the powers the Confederation
Congress had enjoyed, authority “to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the
States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the

75
76

See supra Part I.C.
The convention resolutions for the Committee of Detail are collected at 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 129–33.

Nov. 2010]

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE ELECTIONS

19

77

United States may be interrupted.” However, that resolution had
been adopted rather early in the process, and by the latter part of July, a growing number of delegates apparently were having second
78
thoughts about giving the new Federal Congress so much power.
The Committee of Detail decided to follow the trend rather than the
79
resolution, substituting a list of discrete enumerated federal powers.
On the list was an early version of the Times, Places and Manner
Clause.
The Committee of Detail’s “times, places and manner” clause
granted to the “Legislature of the United States” authority to alter
any state rules regulating the “Times and Places and Manner of hold80
ing the Elections of the Members of each House.” A few days later,
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved to add a proviso ex81
empting from congressional control the places for electing Senators.
They believed that because Senators were to be elected by the state
legislatures, it would not be proper for Congress to dictate where a
82
state legislature was to convene. Although this proviso was voted
down at the time, the Convention reversed itself the following
83
month, and the final version of the Clause was fixed.
The constitutional language governing congressional elections
differed from usual eighteenth-century “manner of election” provisions in two important respects. First, the usual “manner of election”
provision included elector and candidate qualifications, times of election (including terms of office), places of election (including district
84
boundaries), as well as other administrative details. The Constitution, on the other hand, listed qualifications, times, and places sepa-

77
78
79
80

81
82
83
84

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 131; see also Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 1, at
472.
Natelson, Enumerated, supra note 1, at 472–73.
Id. at 473.
The committee version read: “The Times and Places and the Manner of holding the
Elections of the Members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each
State; but their Provisions concerning them may, at any Time, be altered (or superseded)
by the Legislature of the United States.” 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 165 (reporting records of the Committee of Detail). The committee reported to the convention
on August 6, 1787.
On August 9, James Madison and Morris moved to add a proviso exempting the places of
electing Senators, which was voted down. Id. at 240.
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 366 (reporting remarks of James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention).
The latter vote was unanimous. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 613 (Sept. 14,
1787).
See supra Part II.
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85

rately from “Manner.” Second, after providing for qualifications,
times, and places, the Constitution described the residuum as “the
Manner of holding Elections.” This precise phrase seems to have been
86
newly coined to denote a subset of traditional “manner” regulation.
Unlike the phrase “manner of elections,” it excluded qualifications,
times, and places.
In view of the legal qualifications, experience, and abilities of the
men primarily responsible for this language, it is unlikely that the
Constitution’s reference to “Manner of holding” rather than the traditional “manner of elections” was accidental or unconsidered. Indeed, the Constitution’s counterpart for presidential elections, set
forth in Article II, confirms this.
The Article II counterpart to “Manner of holding” was not the Article II phrase that actually employed the word “Manner”—“Each
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may di87
rect, a Number of [presidential] Electors.” That phrase referred to
a manner of appointment rather than election, and permitted states to
dispense with election of presidential electors entirely in favor of
88
another mode of choice, such as designation by the governor. It was
an acknowledgment of state power to fix the qualifications (or identity) of the person or persons appointing the presidential electors, and
as such it served as the counterpart to the provision in Article I authorizing the states to set the qualifications of persons choosing the
89
House of Representatives.

85

86

87
88

89

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (two-year terms for Representatives and qualifications of voters for Representatives), id. cl. 2 (qualifications of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1
(terms of Senators; their electors to be state legislators), id. cl. 3 (qualifications of Senators); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own members . . . .”).
A Jan. 28, 2010 search in the Gale Database, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, which
covers nearly 200,000 works of the era (including most leading legal works), uncovered
no instances of phrases with the words “manner,” “holding,” and “election(s)” within
three words of each other before the publication of the Constitution in 1787. A 1777
New York election law had labeled its “manner” regulations as covering the “mode of
holding elections,” and a 1787 New York law referred to the “mode of conducting” elections. See supra notes 66 & 69 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
Id. But see Kesavan, supra note 29, at 1750 (arguing that “[t]here is little reason to suppose that the word “Manner” in the Times, Places and Manner Clause has a substantially
different meaning from the word “Manner” in Article II, Section 1, Clause 2”). As explained in the text, however, the Article II use of “Manner” is broader than its use in the
Times, Places and Manner Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”).

Nov. 2010]

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE ELECTIONS

21

Rather, the presidential counterpart to the Article I “Manner of
holding” was the list of residual election regulations that makes up
90
most of Article II, Section 1, Clause 3. Like Article I, Article II pro91
92
93
vided separately for times, places, candidate qualifications, and
94
elector qualifications. The residuum (most of Article II, Section 1,
Clause 3) consisted of whom electors could vote for; how many candidates each could vote for; creation of a voting list; signing, certifying, and transmitting the list; the identity of the presiding election
official; formalities of opening of the certified lists; the requirement
that the victor obtain a majority; and procedures for selection if no
95
candidate received a majority.
As the counterpart to Article I’s
“Manner of holding,” this list strongly suggests the sort of rules the
Framers had in mind when they used that phrase in Article I. Moreo90

91

92
93

94

95

Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 provides:
The Electors shall . . . vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not
be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of
all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the
greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of
the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have
such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse [sic] by Ballot one of them for President; and if no
Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall
in like Manner chuse [sic] the President. But in chusing [sic] the President, the
Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one
Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two
thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice.
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest
Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should
remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by
Ballot the Vice President.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the Electors,
and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout
the United States.”); id., art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“He shall hold his Office during the Term of
four Years.”).
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States.”).
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States.”).
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an Elector.”).
Id. art. II, § 1, cl 3.
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ver, when added to qualifications, times, and places, the list corresponds closely to what other contemporary sources have to say about
96
regulating the “manner of elections.”
B. Significance of the Constitutional Plan: The Original Public Meaning
Part II described the understood scope of regulating the “manner
of election” in Anglo-American legal practice. That scope included
the qualifications of electors and elected; terms of office and other
issues of time; legislative districting and other issues of place; and
rules of decision and other Election Day conduct. “Manner of election” also included procedure for both single-tier and double-tier
elections.
Part III.A showed how the Framers divided traditional “manner of
election” rules into qualifications, times, places, and a residual phrase
of narrower scope: “Manner of holding Elections.” The results may
be represented in formulaic terms as follows:
“Manner of election” = Qualifications + Times + Places + “Manner
of holding.”
Or, if one prefers:
“Manner of holding” = “manner of election” – qualifications –
97
times – places.
From the foregoing, we might describe the original public meaning
of congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause
as follows:
 Subject to some override (see below), the Clause left untouched the
states’ reserved police power to regulate elections. State laws were not
necessarily limited to the understood scope of “manner of election”
regulations. States might adopt other kinds of laws, even if they affected federal elections. For example, a state might alter the composition of its legislature in a way that influenced the election of Sena98
tors.
 The Constitution withheld from both state and congressional control
the qualifications and terms of office for Senators and Representatives.
96
97

98

Supra Part II.
The accuracy of this formula was confirmed in the ratification debates by Federalist
spokesman Tench Coxe. Infra note 153 and accompanying text; see also FOSTER’S
MINUTES, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Federalist Henry Marchant at the first sitting of the
Rhode Island ratifying convention as correcting an Anti-Federalist by excluding qualifications of electors from the Times, Places and Manner Clause).
Cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257 (1921) (“Many things are prerequisites to
elections or may affect their outcome—voters, education, means of transportation,
health, public discussion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and figure of
the candidate; but authority to regulate the manner of holding them gives no right to
control any of these.”).
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 The Constitution withheld from congressional control the qualifications of electors for Senators and Representatives and the places of
choosing Senators.
 Subject to the last two exceptions, the Clause granted Congress power
to override state “manner” regulations.
 Because congressional authority was limited by the terms of the grant,
however, the Clause gave Congress no authority to regulate subjects
outside of the understood scope of “manner of election” regulation.

IV. THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER CLAUSE IN THE RATIFICATION
DEBATES
A. The Level of Controversy and the Sources
During the ratification debates, the Times, Places and Manner
Clause proved to be one of the most controversial provisions in the
new Constitution. At the Virginia ratifying convention, delegate
George Nicholas fairly described the extent of the controversy when
he said that objections against the Clause had “echoed from one end
99
of the continent to the other.” Because the Times, Places and Manner Clause was so controversial, the historical record contains a massive number of references to it. For example, the transcript of the
Massachusetts ratifying convention contains several days of debate on
100
the subject.
This embarrassment of riches presents a dilemma. In articles of
this type, my practice has been to provide fairly exhaustive citation
for every historical conclusion, so readers readily can check the
sources for themselves. In the case of the Times, Places and Manner
Clause, exhaustive citation is not possible—footnotes would completely overwhelm the text. Therefore, many of the footnotes below
include illustrative citations only. Readers can access further exam101
ples by checking the indices of standard sources.
B. The Arguments in the Ratification Debates
One of the political principles to which both Anti-Federalists and
Federalists were committed was that of “sympathy” between govern-

99
100
101

3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 9 (reporting remarks by George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention).
Debate on this and related election provisions dominated the debate from January 11,
1788 through January 17. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 5–39.
See, e.g., ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1.
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102

ment officials and governed. Today we might say “empathy” rather
than “sympathy,” but the general idea was that there should an identity of interest and ideals between public officials and the people as a
103
whole. Favorite devices for effectuating sympathy were large legislatures with members elected from small districts and frequent—
104
usually annual—elections.
Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution would not sufficiently assure sympathy. The Senate was to be small, indirectly elected,
and installed for long terms. The President was to be indirectly
elected for a four year term, without the check of an elected executive council. In such a government, the people’s primary hope would
105
lie with the House of Representatives. But the House initially was to
consist only of sixty-five members, and never more than one representative for every thirty thousand people. A body of such small size,
the Anti-Federalists argued, easily could be “corrupted”—diverted
from its duty to serve as the people’s guardians, servants, agents, and
106
trustees.
Anti-Federalists did not claim that every session of Congress would
be so corrupted. But any congressional majority could employ the
Times, Places and Manner Clause to overrule state election laws so as
to ensure its own perpetuity and convert the government into a here-

102
103
104
105

106

See generally, Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and Independence, 91 KY. L.J. 353 (2002–03).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 367–72.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 55 (reporting remarks of Timothy (or James; which
is not certain) Bloodworth in the North Carolina ratifying convention: “The House of
Representatives is the only democratical branch. This clause may destroy representation
entirely”); Cato (N.Y. Gov. George Clinton), Letter VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 240, 241 (“[I]f they will have any security at all in
this government, [they] will find it in the house of representatives.”).
A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT (Mercy Otis Warren), OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Feb.
1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 272, 281 (stating that
“[o]ne Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very inadequate representation;
and every man who is not lost to all sense of freedom to his country, must reprobate the
idea of Congress altering by law, or on any pretence [sic] whatever, interfering with any
regulations for the time, places, and manner of choosing our own Representatives”); see
also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 326 (reporting Governor Clinton, an AntiFederalist, defending the proposed federal Senate: “It was true, he said, the representatives of the people, and the senators, might deviate from their duty, and express a will distinct from that of the people, or that of the legislatures; but any body might see that this
must arise from corruption”); cf. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 32 (reporting remarks by William Widgery at the Massachusetts ratifying convention on the small size of
the representation).
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107

ditary aristocracy. This was exactly why, they asserted, Baron Mon108
tesquieu viewed a republic’s election laws as “fundamental.”
In what ways could Congress manipulate the election laws to assure its own perpetuity? Some of the Anti-Federalist answers were not
tenable from a fair reading of the constitutional text. Among these
was the claim that the Times, Places and Manner Clause would ena109
ble Congress to extend its own terms indefinitely, just as Parliament
previously had extended the terms of the House of Commons from

107

108

109

The alleged aristocratic tendencies of the Times, Places and Manner Clause—and, indeed, of the entire Constitution—were a common Anti-Federalist theme. E.g., Cincinnatus, Letter VI: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 360, 363; cf. Centinel, Letter VIII, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Jan.
2, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 231, 232 (“[T]hat which
gives Congress the absolute controul [sic] over the time and mode of its appointment
and election, whereby, independent of any other means, they may establish hereditary
despotism . . . .”). For more information, see the Anti-Federalist satire written by “Aristocrotis,” who discussed how the Times, Places and Manner Clause could be used to create
a hereditary aristocracy. ARISTOCROTIS (William Petrikin), THE GOVERNMENT OF NATURE
DELINEATED; OR AN EXACT PICTURE OF THE NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1788), cited in
17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 229, reprinted in 2 MFM. SUPP. Pa. 661.
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 13, 24 (quoting Montesquieu); Federal Farmer, Letter XII, Jan. 12, 1788,
reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 310 (“It is well observed by Montesquieu, that in republican governments, the forms of elections are fundamental; and
that it is an essential part of the social compact, to ascertain by whom, to whom, when,
and in what manner suffrages are to be given. Wherever we find the regulation of elections have not been carefully fixed by the constitution, or the principles of them, we constantly see the legislatures new modifying its own form, and changing the spirit of the
government to answer partial purposes.”); see also Address of the Minority of the Md. Convention, ANNAPOLIS GAZETTE, May 1, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 242, 246 (“The second objection respecting the power of congress to alter elections,
they thought indispensable. Montesquieu says, that the rights of election should be established unalterably by fundamental laws in a free government.”).
Agrippa, Letter I, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 303, 305 (“Should the people cry aloud the representative may avail himself of the right to alter the time of election and postpone it for another year.”); Centinel V,
PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 4, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 343, 347; Samuel, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 678, 680 (“And there is nothing to hinder, but ample provision
made, for Congress to make themselves perpetual. For by Art. I, Sect. 4 the Congress may
at any time, make and alter the time, place and manner of choosing Representatives; and
the time and manner of choosing Senators.”); see also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at
52 (reporting remarks by Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina ratifying convention);
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS, supra note 108, at 23; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 426 (reporting remarks by Robert Whitehill at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention).
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110

three to seven years.
Anti-Federalists argued that Congress could
111
impose additional qualifications on voters and candidates for office,
112
rip the choice of Senators away from the state legislatures, and
113
eventually annihilate the states.
When the Federalists pointed out
114
that such apprehensions were contradicted by the text, some Anti-

110

111

112

113

114

Anti-Federalists frequently cited this precedent. See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1,
at 61–62 (reporting remarks by David Caldwell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); Agrippa, Letter XIII, supra note 35, at 770; Centinel III, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER,
Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 55, 60.
Cornelius, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 410, 413 (“By this Federal Constitution, each House is to be the judge, not only
of the elections, and returns, but also of the qualifications of its members; and that, without any other rule than such as they themselves may prescribe.”). For another entrant in
this Anti-Federalist parade of horribles, see Agrippa, Letter XIII, supra note 35, at 770 (By
altering the time they may continue a representative during his whole life; by altering the
manner, they may fill up the vacancies by their own votes without the consent of the
people; and by altering the place, all the elections may be made at the seat of the federal
government). See also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 175–76 (reporting remarks of
Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying convention on voter qualifications, citing
precedent of ancient Rome).
Letter from Samuel Osgood, to Samuel Adams (Jan. 5, 1787), reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 263, 265 (“How far the Word ‘Manner’ extends I
know not—But I suppose, if Congress should determine, that the People at large, or a
certain Description of them, should vote on the Senators, it would only be altering the
Manner of choosing them—If this be true, Congress will have the exclusive Right of
pointing out the Qualification of the Voters for Senators . . . .”).
Luther Martin, Genuine Information IV, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 296, 299 (claiming that the Times, Places and
Manner Clause was designed to annihilate the state governments); 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 397–98 (reporting remarks by Robert Whitehill at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
E.g., 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 202–03 (reporting remarks of Edmund Randolph at the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 53 (reporting remarks of James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 60–61
(reporting remarks by William Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 63
(reporting remarks by [probably William rather than Archibald] MacLaine at the same
convention); A Citizen of New Haven (Roger Sherman), Observations on the New Federal
Constitution, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 280, 282 (“[T]he qualifications of the electors [for House of Representatives]
are to remain as fixed by the constitutions and laws of the several states.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 195, 199; A Freeman (Tench Coxe), Letter II, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 508, 509 (“The elections of the President, Vice President, Senators and Representatives, are exclusively in the hands of the
states, even as to filling vacancies. The smallest interference of Congress is not permitted,
either in prescribing the qualifications of electors, or in determining what persons may or
may not be elected. The clause which enables the foederal [sic] legislature to make regulations on this head, permits them only to say at what time in the two years the house of
representatives shall be chosen, at what time in the six years the Senate shall be chosen,
and at what time in the four years the President shall be elected; but these elections, by
other provisions in the constitution, must take place every two, four and six years . . . .”).
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Federalists responded that the Times, Places and Manner Clause
trumped the Constitution’s language governing qualifications and
115
terms because that Clause appeared later in the instrument. To be
sure, this reading contradicted the rules of construction in force dur116
ing the Founding Era.
But, as one North Carolina Anti-Federalist
117
suggested, “sophistry would enable them to reconcile them.” As farfetched as these Anti-Federalist claims may have been, they were
grounded in the public meaning of what it was to regulate the “man118
ner of election.” One problem, however, is that they were not encompassed by the phrase the Constitution actually used: “Manner of
119
holding Elections.”
Other Anti-Federalist concerns were more consistent with the text.
Some of the Constitution’s opponents observed that the Clause was
120
not particularly well-drafted, leaving it open to misconstruction.
Federalists do not seem to have addressed that concern. Other AntiFederalists expressed apprehension that Congress might fix the date
and place of election to benefit the powerful and employ pluralitywinner rules and viva voce voting to assure the election of favored
121
candidates.
These latter concerns were realistic in a world in which electors
convened in open meetings in central locations to vote and in which
115

116

117
118
119
120

121

E.g., Consider Arms, Malachi Maynard & Samuel Field, Dissent to the Massachusetts Convention, NORTHAMPTON HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, April 9 & 16, 1788, reprinted in 17
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 42, 44 (“[Y]et all this is wholly superseded by a
subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law, whereby such
regulations may be altered, except as to the places of chusing [sic] senators.”).
One example of such a rule is the rule of construction against surplus. See TIMOTHY
BRANCH, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATIS 134 (London 1753) (Sic interpretandum est ut Verba
accipiantur cum effectu—that is, “One should interpret so that words are received with an
effect” (translation by the author)); see also id. at 117 (Verba aliquid operari debent,—debent
intelligi ut aliquid operentur—“Words should have some effect; they should be understood
to have an effect (translation by the author)). Thus, Federalist Robert Steele could ask
the North Carolina ratifying convention: “Is it not a maxim of universal jurisprudence, of
reason and common sense, that an instrument or deed of writing shall be so construed as
to give validity to all parts of it, if it can be done without involving any absurdity?” 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 71.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 106 (reporting remarks of William Taylor at the
North Carolina ratifying convention).
See supra Part II.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
E.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note1, at 54–55 (reporting remarks of Samuel Spencer at
the North Carolina ratifying convention); A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, A REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 255, 262–
63 (attacking the ambiguity of the Clause, and stating that it cannot be merely to provide
regulations if a state refuses to do so, because if the state does not hold an election, there
can be nothing to regulate).
Infra notes 123–27and accompanying text.
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people living in remote areas might spend several days traveling to
the designated location. If Congress were to decree that elections
were to be held in the middle of winter or during harvest time, many
122
voters would be effectively disenfranchised. Moreover, there was no
requirement that Representatives be elected in districts. Congress
could decide that a state’s entire delegation would be selected at
123
124
large and designate a single location for voting in each state.
A
Congress dominated by the merchant class might select a seacoast location in each state (for example, Boston or New York City), thereby
making it easy for merchants and their allies to vote and very difficult

122

123

124

Cato (N.Y. Gov. George Clinton), Letter VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 240, 241 (“Congress may establish a place, or
places, at either the extremes, center, or outer parts of the states; at a time and season too,
when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these means destroy the rights of election”
(emphasis added)).
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 327 (reporting remarks of Melancthon Smith at the
New York ratifying convention); Federal Farmer, Letter III, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 30, 31.
Cato (N.Y. Gov. George Clinton), Letter VII, N.Y. J., Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 105, at 240, 241–42 (“It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to suppose, that what may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to suppose, that in the exercise of this government, a regulation
of congress will be made, for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie, at
New-York [sic], or, perhaps, at Fort-Stanwix [sic]: who will then be the actual electors for
the house of representatives?”); see also Cumberland County Petition to the Pennsylvania
Convention, Dec. 5, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 309, 311
(“Here appears to be scarcely the shadow of representation provided, because the Congress may at their pleasure, order the election for the Representatives of the State of
Pennsylvania, to be held in Philadelphia, where it will be impossible for the people of the
state to assemble for the purpose; and thus the citizens of Philadelphia would be
represented, and scarcely any part else of the commonwealth. The MANNER and TIME
may prevent three-fourths of the present electors of the state, from giving a vote as long
as they live.”).
As “Cato’s” comment about Fort Stanwix illustrates, some Anti-Federalists suggested
that elections might be held only in remote, inconvenient areas. E.g., Anonymous, Blessings of the New Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct 6, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 345–46 (satirically claiming, “Among the blessings
of the new-proposed government our correspondent enumerates the following. . . . Elections for Pennsylvania held at Pittsburg, or perhaps Wyoming [Pennsylvania]”); see also 2
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 30 (reporting remarks by Charles Turner at the Massachusetts ratifying convention as saying the elections might be held at the “extremity of a
state”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 55 (reporting remarks of Timothy (or James;
which is not certain) Bloodworth in the North Carolina ratifying convention: expressing
similar sentiments); Letter from Richard Henry Lee, to James Gordon, Jr. (Feb. 26,
1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 210, 212 (suggesting that
Virginia’s elections might be held at Cape Henry).
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125

for back-country farmers to do so. Anti-Federalists alleged that this
126
already had proved a problem in some states.
The Anti-Federalist essayist calling himself “The Federal Farmer”
emphasized the danger from a plurality-victor rule. In a scattered
field of candidates, a relatively low percentage of the vote might
amount to a plurality. A small but organized commercial or “aristocratic” faction could easily elect an unpopular candidate in a crowded
field, particularly if the polls were located in a city dominated by that
127
faction.
To show that this was not a chimerical fear, the Federal
128
Farmer cited precedents.
Other Anti-Federalists pointed to Congress’s power to mandate viva voce voting, thereby better enabling
129
dominant factions to control election results.
“Brutus,” one of the best of the Anti-Federalist writers and a com130
mon foil for the “Publius” of the Federalist Papers, summarized
these concerns:

125

126

127

128
129

130

See, e.g., Vox Populi, MASS. GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 168, 170 (“Supposing Congress should direct, that the representatives of
this commonwealth should be chosen all in one town, (Boston, for instance) on the first
day of March—would not that be a very injurious institution to the good people of this
commonwealth?—Would not there be at least nine-tenths of the landed interest of this
commonwealth entirely unrepresented? . . . . What, then, would be the case if Congress
should think proper to direct, that the elections should be held at the north-west, southwest, or north-east part of the state, the last day of March? How many electors would attend the business?”); see Cornelius, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 410, 413–14 (discussing the risk that mercantile
interests will dominate elections located in seaport towns); see also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES,
supra note 1, at 60 (reporting remarks by Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying convention expressing similar fears); AMERICAN HERALD, Jan. 14, 1788, reprinted in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 709, 711 (expressing similar fears); Cato (N.Y.
Gov. George Clinton), supra note 105, at 242 (“And would not the government by this
means have it in their power to put whom they pleased in the house of representatives?”).
Centinel I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 5, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 326, 334 (“[T]he inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote
from the seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniencies and disadvantages they are subjected to on this account, and that, to enjoy the comforts of local
government, they are separating into smaller divisions.”).
Federal Farmer, supra note 123, at 31. Lee argued that the Constitution should have required single-member districts and that Representatives reside in their districts. Id. at 32.
His most complete treatment is in Federal Farmer, supra note 108, at 311–15.
Federal Farmer, supra note 108, at 314 (referring to British and American precedents).
Centinel III, supra note 110, at 59 (stating that Congress could abolish the secret ballot);
see also Letter from William Symmes, Jr., to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), reprinted in
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 107, 110 (stating that instead of allowing
Congress to prescribe the manner of holding elections, the Constitution should have specified the manner, such as the secret ballot).
“Brutus” may have been Judge Robert Yates, who had served as a federal convention delegate from New York, but left the convention early in dissatisfaction.
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It is clear that, under [the Times, Places and Manner Clause] the foederal [sic] legislature may institute such rules respecting elections as to lead
to the choice of one description of men. The weakness of the representation [i.e., small size of the House], tends but too certainly to confer on
the rich and well-born, all honours; but the power granted in this [section], may be so exercised, as to secure it almost beyond a possibility of
controul [sic]. The proposed Congress may make the whole state one
district, and direct, that the capital . . . shall be the place for holding the
election; the consequence would be, that none but men of the most elevated rank in society would attend . . . They may declare that those members who have the greatest number of votes, shall be considered as duly
elected; the consequence would be that the people, who are dispersed in
the interior parts of the state, would give their votes for a variety of candidates, while any order or profession, residing in populous places, by
uniting their interests, might procure whom they pleased to be chosen—
and by this means the representatives of the state may be elected by one
131
tenth part of the people who actually vote.

Accordingly, Anti-Federalists urged that the Constitution either be rejected, accepted after removal of the Times, Places and Manner
132
Clause, or amended to weaken congressional control over elections.
If the final say over federal elections had to be lodged somewhere,

131

132

Brutus, Letter IV, N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 297, 301–02; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 11 (reporting remarks by
remarks of Ebenezer Peirce [sic] at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
E.g., Agrippa, Letter XVI, MASS. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 863, 865 (proposing that “the [C]onstitution . . . be received only upon” condition that it be amended to limit congressional power to “fining such state
as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not exceeding the expense
of supporting its representatives or senators one year”); Federal Farmer, supra note 108,
at 318 (“[A]t most, congress ought to have power to regulate elections only where a state
shall neglect to make them.”); Robert Whitehall, Reporting Remarks, reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 598 (observing “that the several states shall have
power to regulate the elections for Senators and Representatives, without being controlled either directly or indirectly by any interference on the part of Congress”). George
Mason suggested as part of a proposed bill of rights that
Congress shall not exercise the [Times, Places and Manner Clause], but in Cases
when a State neglects or refuses to make the Regulations therein mentioned, or
shall make Regulations subversive of the Rights of the People to a free and equal
Representation in Congress agreeably to the Constitution, or shall be prevented
from making Elections by Invasion or Rebellion; and in any of these Cases, such
Powers shall be exercised by the Congress only until the Cause be removed.
Letter from George Mason to John Lamb (June 9, 1788) (enclosure), reprinted in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 40, 44. A caucus of Pennsylvania citizens proposed another amendment to similar effect. Proceedings of the Meeting at Harrisburg,
Sept. 3, 1788, reprinted in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 542 (“That Congress shall
not have power to make or alter regulations concerning the time, place, and manner of
electing senators and representatives, except in case of neglect or refusal by the state to
make regulations for the purpose; and then only for such time as such neglect or refusal
shall continue.”); see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 325–26 (reporting remarks
of Samuel Jones at the New York ratifying convention).
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they said, lodging it in the state legislatures was a less risky alternative
than placing it in Congress. State legislatures were more numerous
bodies, usually elected annually, and thus more likely to be in sympa133
thy with the interests of the people.
In addition, state lawmakers
134
were familiar with local conditions.
Anti-Federalist arguments about the Times, Places and Manner
Clause resonated even with some of those otherwise committed to the
Constitution; indeed, a number of important Federalists acknowledged the force of those arguments. Noah Webster (the future lex135
icographer) wrote an influential pamphlet praising every aspect of
the Constitution, but criticizing the Times, Places and Manner Clause
136
He argued that the Clause
as unclear and potentially dangerous.
could be read as giving a power to Congress to make regulations
137
“prescribed ‘in each State by the Legislature thereof,’” a phrase he
said made no sense. He added that to the extent the Clause gave
Congress power to “alter” regulations already prescribed, it “put[] the
election of representatives wholly, and the senators almost wholly, in
138
the power of Congress.”
“I see no occasion,” he wrote, “for any
power in Congress to interfere with the choice of their own
139
body . . . . [T]he clause . . . gives needless and dangerous powers . . . .”

133

134

135
136

137

138
139

Republican Federalist, Essay VI, MASS. CENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1788, reprinted in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 843, 847; see also Brutus, supra note 131, at 302;
Federal Farmer, supra note 108, at 317.
Agrippa, supra note 132, at 864 (“As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to
suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the business. All human
capacities are limitted [sic] to a narrow space; and as no individual is capable of practising [sic] a great variety of trades no single legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of
the judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence arises the
necessity of a division of the business into national and local.”); see also Letter from William Symmes, Jr., to Peter Osgood, Jr., supra note 129, at 107–16 (stating that he did not
think Congress would have the wisdom to make regulations within the states); Vox Populi,
supra note 125, at 170 (“And it is a little remarkable, that any gentleman should suppose,
that Congress could possibly be in any measure as good judges of the time, place and
manner of elections as the legislatures of the several respective states.”).
Letter from James McClurg to James Madison (Oct. 31, 1787), reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 406 (implying the importance of the pamphlet).
A Citizen of America (Noah Webster), An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution (1787), reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE
“OTHER” FEDERALISTS 1787–1788, at 373 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds.,
1998).
Id. at 387. At least one Anti-Federalist repeated Webster’s points about the vagueness of
the Clause. Expositor, Essay II, N.Y. J., Apr. 28, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 823, 828–29.
A Citizen of America, supra note 136, at 387 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Webster urged that the ratifying conventions accept the rest of the
140
Constitution but reject that provision.
Webster was then a young political newcomer, but some seasoned
Federalists shared his doubts as well—among them, James McClurg,
141
who had served as a delegate to the federal convention. Some Federalists suggested that the Clause be amended to scale back congres142
sional control over federal elections.

140
141

142

Id.
Letter from James McClurg to James Madison, supra note 135, at 406. Another Federalist
skeptic was David Ramsey, a former president of Congress and leading supporter of the
Constitution in South Carolina. Letter from David Ramsey to Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10,
1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 83, 84; see also FOSTER’S
MINUTES, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Federalist Benjamin Bourn at the first sitting of the
Rhode Island ratifying convention as conceding, “this is the most except[ion]al part of
the Constitution” [meaning the most exceptionable part]); Letter from George Cabot, to
Theophilus Parsons (Feb. 28, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 248, 249 (suggesting that some uniform rules could have been put in the Constitution
rather than relying wholly on the discretion of Congress and the states); Letter from John
Brown Cutting, to William Short (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 475, 479 (without mentioning Webster, echoing that writer’s views about
the Times, Places and Manner Clause); Letter from Walter Minto, to the Earl of Buchan
(Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 505 (complaining
of the same lack of clarity Webster cited; generally supporting the Constitution, but stating of the Times, Places and Manner Clause, that “[t]here are three or four things in it
that I do not like. Of these there is one which must be thrown out”); Letter from George
Lee Turberville, to James Madison (Apr. 16, 1788), reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 23, 24 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977) (lavishly praising
Constitution in general, but decrying the lack of clarity of Times, Places and Manner
Clause); see also Many Customers, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 1, 1787, reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 306, 307–08 (acknowledging that the Constitution has many virtues but proposing omitting the Times, Places and Manner Clause).
The young John Quincy Adams also was doubtful. Letter from John Quincy Adams to
William Cranch (Oct. 14, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
222 (“Why must congress have the power of regulating the times, places, and manner of
holding elections; or in other words, of prescribing the manner of their own appointments. This power is insidious, because it appears trivial, and yet will admit of such construction, as will render it a very dangerous instrument in the hands of such a powerful
body of men.”). His correspondent favored a power to regulate time in the interest of
uniformity, but saw no reason for place and manner powers. Letter from William
Cranch, to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 224, 225.
E.g., Hampden, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 806, 808 (proposing adopting the Constitution with an amendment striking
the Clause and inserting: “But if any State shall refuse to prescribe time and place for
such elections, Congress shall provide therefor [sic] by laws made for that purpose”).
The author added the following “Remark”: “this amendment takes off the main objection made to this article, and gives Congress power to perpetuate its own existence.” Id;
see also Letter from David Ramsey to Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10, 1787), supra note 141, at 84
(favoring amendment to make the Times, Places and Manner Clause applicable only if
states failed to make regulations).
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Those defenders of the Constitution who did not share AntiFederalist doubts argued that the inherent legislative responsibility to
“Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Mem143
bers” included authority to ensure that elections were conducted
144
fairly. They added that the Clause would enable Congress to fix na145
tionally-uniform election days, thereby forestalling opportunities
146
for intrigue by factions and the well-connected. At least some Anti147
Federalists agreed with the latter idea, but pointed out that the
148
scope of the Clause far exceeded the power to fix such a day. If the
latter were the Framers’ goal, then why had they not merely fixed a
149
day in the Constitution, or at least granted Congress power to do so
150
using language similar to that in the Time Clause of Article II?

143
144

145

146

147
148

149

150

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns,
and Qualifications of its own Members.”).
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 537 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention); see also id. at 510 (reporting remarks by James Wilson
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 214, 216; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 413 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 10–11 (reporting remarks by George Nicholas at the
Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 367 (reporting remarks by James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 105 (reporting remarks
by James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 413 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention).
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 510 (quoting the notes of William Findley, an
Anti-Federalist leader at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
Letter from William Cranch to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26, 1787), supra note 141, at
225 (favoring a power to regulate time in the interest of uniformity, but opposing place
and manner powers).
Anonymous, Strictures on the Proposed Constitution, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Sep. 26, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 243, 245 (“The time, then, might as
well have been fixed in Convention—not subject to alteration afterwards.” (emphasis in
original)). Hamilton responded that this “was a matter which might safely be entrusted
to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it might upon experiment
have been found less convenient than some other time.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 145, at 216; see also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 367,
408 (reporting remarks of James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention, expressing
similar sentiments). Edmund Randolph’s initial outline of a constitution for the Committee of Detail (before emendations by John Rutledge) had mandated a uniform day:
“The elections shall be biennially held on the same day through the state(s): except in case
of accidents, and where an adjournment to the succeeding day may be necessary.” 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 139 (reproducing records of the Committee of Detail).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the
Electors, and the Day of which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.”).
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Federalists responded in a number of ways. First, they emphasized
the purely residual nature of the power to regulate the “Manner of
holding” congressional elections. As Tench Coxe, perhaps the most
151
influential Federalist essayist at the time, remarked:
Congress therefore were [sic] vested also with the power . . . of prescribing merely the circumstances under which the elections shall be holden
[sic], not the qualifications of the electors, nor those of the elected—nor
the duration of the senate—nor the duration of the representatives.
152
These are prescribed by the constitution, unalterably by Congress.”

To Anti-Federalist suggestions that Congress might abuse its authority, the friends of the Constitution responded with scenarios of their
own. The state legislatures might run amok if left in unchecked con153
trol of federal elections. They might require electors to assemble in
154
a remote location. They might draw congressional districts in gross155
156
ly unfair ways. They might mandate viva voce voting. They might
rig the election rules so that state legislatures controlled the House of
157
Representatives as well as the Senate.
Federalists supplemented their case by adding that congressional
abuse of the Times, Places and Manner Clause was unlikely because
158
of a lack of motive, because the diverse interests of states and “fac151
152
153

154

155

156
157

158

JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 111 (1978).
A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA. GAZETTE, Jun. 11, 1788, reprinted in 20
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1139, 1145 (italics in original).
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 145, at 214–15; Rufus
King and Nathaniel Gorham, Response to Elbridge Gerry’s Objections (Nov. 3, 1787), reprinted
in FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 280, 281–82; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra
note 1, at 27 (reporting remarks by Theophilus Parsons at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention).
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 441 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); id. at 303 (reporting remarks by Charles Coatsworth
Pinckney during the South Carolina legislative debates preparatory to calling a state ratifying convention); FOSTER’S MINUTES, supra note 1, at 45 (quoting Federalist William Barton at the first sitting of the Rhode Island ratifying convention as defending the Clause as
a way for Congress to prevent states from fixing an inconvenient voting place).
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 50–51 (reporting remarks by Rufus King at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 367 (reporting remarks of James Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention).
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 413 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 441 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); id. at 26 (reporting remarks by Theophilus Parsons at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention). This concern also had been expressed at the federal
convention. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 240–41 (recording comments by
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris).
A Citizen of New Haven (Roger Sherman), supra note 114, at 282 (“[W]hat motive can
either [the state legislatures or Congress] have to injure the people in the exercise of that
right?”); Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown Addressee (Dec. 8, 1787), reprinted in
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 386, 388; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Al-
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159

tions” would prevent it from happening, because such a move
160
would ignite popular outrage, and because the Senate would
161
They also noted
represent the interests of the state legislatures.
that Congress’s power over “manner” would be no greater than that
162
exercised by the states.
None of these was the proponents’ decisive argument, however.
Their decisive argument was one that had first been raised at the fed163
eral convention: that the Times, Places and Manner Clause was
needed to enable Congress to preserve its own existence. In absence
of a congressional power to regulate congressional elections, a group
of states could destroy the House of Representatives by refusing to
provide for those elections or by creating regulations designed to sabotage them. As a precedent, the Federalists alleged that Rhode Island had damaged the operations of the Confederation Congress by
164
refusing to send delegates to that body. The Federalists made this
165
argument over and over, using it to sway votes in crucial states.

159

160

161
162

163
164

exander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 196. Hamilton and others suggested that a ruthless Congress with an army behind it would not seize power by the indirect method of
rigging the election laws. Id. at 199; see also 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 10 (reporting remarks of George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention).
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 303 (reporting remarks by Charles Coatsworth
Pinckney during the South Carolina legislative debates preparatory to calling a state ratifying convention as stating, “it cannot be supposed that any state wilt consent to fix the
election at inconvenient seasons and places in any other state, lest she herself should hereafter experience the same inconvenience”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 196; cf. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 510 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention as stating, “the general
government will be more studious of the good of the whole than a particular state will
be”).
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 196; cf. 3 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 1, at 408 (reporting remarks of James Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention); Letter from Timothy Pickering, to Charles Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787),
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 193, 196–97 (claiming that Congress would have nothing to gain from abusive regulations, that it would cost Senate and
President their seats).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 114, at 27 (reporting remarks
by Theophilus Parsons at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 61 (quoting William Davie at the North Carolina
ratifying convention, “Congress has ultimately no power over elections, but what is primarily given to the state legislatures”).
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 240–41 (recording comments by Rufus King and
Gouverneur Morris).
E.g., A Friend of Society and Liberty (Tench Coxe), PA. GAZETTE, Jul. 23, 1788, reprinted in
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 277, 280; A Landholder (Oliver Ellsworth),
Letter IV, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 231, 233–
34 (citing the case of Rhode Island); A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention (Tench
Coxe), supra note 152, at 1144–45 (citing the case of Rhode Island). Anti-Federalists responded that the depiction of Rhode Island’s malefactions was greatly overdrawn. E.g., 2
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In New York, for example, Alexander Hamilton developed the
“congressional self-preservation” argument at length in Number 59 of
166
He suggested that foreign influence might induce
The Federalist.
some states to try to destroy the central government by sabotaging
167
elections for the House of Representatives.
Hamilton acknowledged that a group of states also could destroy the central govern-

ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 23 (reporting remarks by Phanuel Bishop at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); Agrippa, supra note 132, at 863. But see id. (reporting
remarks by Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham assuring Bishop of the accuracy of the
charge against Rhode Island, to Bishop’s satisfaction); id. at 24 (reporting remarks of Caleb Strong at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
165
E.g., Cassius, Letter VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1788, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 423, 425–426 (“What is intended, by saying that Congress shall
have power to appoint the place for electing representatives, is, only to have a check
upon the legislature of any state, if they should happen to be composed of villains and
knaves, as is the case in a sister state; and should take upon themselves to appoint a place
for choosing delegates to send to Congress; which place might be the most inconvenient
in the whole state; and for that reason be appointed by the legislature, in order to create
a disgust [i.e., distaste] in the minds of the people against the federal government, if they
themselves should dislike it.”). Besides those mentioned in the text, additional examples
of Federalist use of this argument were as follows:
Massachusetts: Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham, Response to Elbridge Gerry’s Objections
(Nov. 3, 1787), reprinted in FARRAND, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 280, 281–82.
New York: Fabius, ALBANY FED. HERALD, Mar. 17, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 862, 863 (expressing similar sentiments); Albany Federal Committee, An Impartial Address (1788), reprinted in 21 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
1388, 1391; A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention (Tench Coxe), supra note 152, at
1145.
North Carolina: 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 53–54 (reporting remarks of James
Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 59 (reporting remarks of William
Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention).
Pennsylvania: 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 544 (reporting remarks by Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1,
at 440–41 (reporting remarks by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
Virginia: 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 9–10 (reporting remarks by George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 367 (reporting remarks of James Madison in
the same convention).
See also Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 734, 738 (“[T]he obstinacy of one State might lead them to refuse to elect at
all. In others, perhaps, the legislature might abuse the inhabitants, by appointing a place
for holding the elections, which would prevent some from attending, and burthen others
with very great inconveniences.”); Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast
(Nov. 24, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 193, 196–97 (expressing similar sentiments). A variation of this argument was that congressional power to
regulate congressional elections was necessary to the independence of Congress. A Friend
to Good Government, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 15, 1788, reprinted in 20
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 917, 918–19.
166
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 185, 186.
167
Id. at 189.
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168

ment by refusing to elect Senators. But he pointed out that destroying the government by refusing to elect Senators would be more difficult than doing so by refusing to elect members of the House: The
terms of only a third of the Senators would expire at any one time, so
destruction of the upper chamber would take several years. The
terms of the entire House expired at once, so that body could be obli169
terated at once.
In Maryland, convention delegate James McHenry added that the
risk to the federal government might not arise from state malice: An
insurrection or rebellion might prevent a state legislature from ad170
ministering an election.
As James Iredell told the North Carolina
ratifying convention, “[a]n occasion may arise when the exercise of
this ultimate power in Congress may be necessary . . . if a state should
be involved in war, and its legislature could not assemble, (as was the
case of South Carolina, and occasionally of some other states, during
171
the late war).”
Anti-Federalists observed that the terms of the Times, Places and
Manner Clause did not limit congressional power to emergency
172
use.
Nevertheless, the congressional self-preservation argument
seems to have convinced many. Noah Webster, for one, resorted to it

168

169

170

171
172

The Anti-Federalist “Federal Farmer” had pointed this out. Federal Farmer, supra note
108, at 316 (“Should the state legislatures be disposed to be negligent, or to combine to
break up congress, they have a very simple way to do it, as the constitution now stands—
they have only to neglect to chuse [sic] senators.”). It was conceded by former federal
convention delegate William Davie at the North Carolina ratifying convention. 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 58.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 166, at 188 (“But with regard
to the Fœderal [sic] House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election
of members once in two years.”).
James McHenry, Speech Before the Maryland State House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787),
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 279, 282 (stating that the “Convention had in Contemplation the possible events of Insurrection, Invasion, and even to provide against any disposition that might occur hereafter in any particular State to thwart
the measures of the General Government”).
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 53–54.
Luther Martin, Speech Before the Maryland State House of Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787),
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 285, 289 (stating “if it was intended to relate to the cases of Insurrection or Invasion, why not by express words confine the power to these objects?”). Of course, the Suspension Clause had been so limited.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”);
see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 23, 25 (reporting remarks of Phanuel Bishop
at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES supra note 1, at 403 (reporting remarks of George Mason at the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES supra note 1, at 56–57 (reporting remarks of William Goudy and William McDowell at the North Carolina ratifying convention).
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in a tract in which he reversed his earlier opposition. However, the
congressional-preservation argument carried with it a corollary: If
Congress’s power to fix the “Manner of holding Elections” was designed principally to preserve Congress from destruction or serious
prejudice, then perhaps the power should be construed as applying
only in situations that threatened destruction or serious prejudice.
Some Anti-Federalists proposed constitutional amendments to
174
write this corollary into the document.
Notable advocates of the
Constitution signaled that they would be open to such amend175
176
ments—among them James Iredell and David Ramsey, leading
Federalist spokesmen in North and South Carolina, respectively. Ac177
cordingly, the ratifying conventions of Massachusetts, South Caroli178
179
180
181
182
na, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina,

173

174

175

176

177
178

179

America (Noah Webster), To the Dissenting Members of the Late Convention of Pennsylvania,
N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 194, 195 (stating “the time and manner of exercising that right [election] are very
wisely vested in Congress, otherwise a delinquent State might embarrass the measures of
the Union. The safety of the public requires that the Federal body should prevent any
particular delinquency”).
Supra note 132; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 552 (reproducing an
amendment proposed by the minority at the Maryland Ratifying Convention, “[t]hat the
Congress shall have no power to alter or change the time, place, or manner of holding
elections for senators or representatives, unless a state shall neglect to make regulations,
or to execute its regulations, or shall be prevented by invasion or rebellion; in which cases
only, Congress may interfere, until the cause be removed”).
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 54 (“I should, therefore, not object to the recommendation of an amendment similar to that of other states—that this power in Congress
should only be exercised when a state legislature neglected or was disabled from making
the regulations required.”).
Letter from David Ramsey to Benjamin Rush, supra note 141, at 84 (“If the clause which
gives Congress power to interfere with the State regulations for electing members of their
body was . . . altered so as to confine that power simply to the cases in which the States
omitted to make any regulations on the subject I should be better pleased.”).
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 68 (quoting Massachusetts amendments).
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 71–72 (“Whereas it is essential to the preservation of the rights reserved to the several states, and the freedom of the people under the
operations of a general government that the right of prescribing the manner, time and
places of holding the elections to the federal legislature, should be for ever inseparably
annexed to the sovereignty of the several states. This Convention doth declare, that the
same ought to remain to all posterity a perpetual and fundamental right in the local, exclusive of the interference of the general government, except in cases where the legislatures of the states shall refuse or neglect to perform and fulfill the same, according to the
tenor of the said constitution.”).
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 187–88 (“That Congress do not exercise the
powers vested in them by the 4th section of the first article, but in cases when a state shall
neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations
contrary to a free and equal representation.”).
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183

and Rhode Island all proposed such amendments. The Massachusetts amendment is illustrative:
That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the 4th section of the 1st article but in cases where a state shall neglect or refuse to
make regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation in
184
Congress, agreeably to the constitution.

Leading Federalists argued that, even without amendment, the
Clause should be construed as limited to emergencies. Alexander
Contee Hanson, a member of Congress whose pamphlet supporting
185
the Constitution proved popular, stated flatly that Congress would
exercise its times, places, and manner authority only in cases of invasion, legislative neglect or obstinate refusal to pass election laws, or if
a state crafted its election laws with a “sinister purpose” or to injure
the general government. “It was never meant,” Hanson wrote, “that
congress should at any time interfere, unless on the failure of a state
180

181

182

183

184
185

3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 661, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 205 (“That Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or
manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, or either of them, except
when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled, by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”).
The New York ratification instrument provided as follows:
[T]hat the Congress shall not make or alter any Regulation in any State respecting
the times places and manner of holding Elections for Senators or Representatives,
unless the Legislature of such State shall neglect or refuse to make Laws or Regulations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the
same; and then only until the Legislature of such State shall make provision in the
Premises; provided that Congress may prescribe the time for the Election of Representatives.
Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 249 (“The Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner, of holding elections for senators and representatives,
or either of them, except when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”).
The Rhode Island ratification instrument provided as follows:
Congress shall not alter, modify or interfere in the times, places or manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, or either of them, except when the
legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion
to prescribe the same; or in case when the provision made by the states, is so imperfect as that no consequent election is had, and then only until the legislature of
such state, shall make provision in the premises.
Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratri.asp.
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 68 (quoting Massachusetts amendments).
On March 27, 1788, Hanson wrote to Tench Coxe of “the avidity, with which I am informed my humble essay has been bought up.” Letter from Alexander Contee Hanson to
Tench Coxe (Mar. 27, 1788), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 520, 521 (internal citations omitted).
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legislature, or to alter such regulations as may be obviously impro186
per.”
Federalist Jasper Yeates made a similar representation to the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention: “Sir, let it be remembered that
this power can only operate in a case of necessity, after the factious or
listless disposition of a particular state has rendered an interference
187
essential to the salvation of the general government.” John Jay im188
plied as much at the New York convention.
Accordingly, the ratifying conventions of three states—New
189
190
191
York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island —adopted resolutions
of understanding limiting the scope.

186
187
188

189

190

191

Aristides (Alexander Contee Hanson), Remarks on the Proposed Plan (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 522, 526.
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 437 (reporting remarks by Jasper Yeates at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 1, at 326 (“Suppose that, by design or accident, the states
should neglect to appoint representatives; certainly there should be some constitutional
remedy for this evil. The obvious meaning of the paragraph was, that, if this neglect
should take place, Congress should have power, by law, to support the government, and
prevent the dissolution of the Union. He believed this was the design of the federal Convention.”)
The New York ratifying convention resolved as follows:
In full Confidence . . . that the Congress will not make or alter any Regulation in
this State respecting the times places and manner of holding Elections for Senators or Representatives unless the Legislature of this State shall neglect or refuse to
make Laws or regulations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable
of making the same, and that in those cases such power will only be exercised until
the Legislature of this State shall make provision in the Premises.
Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp. The New York convention added
this paragraph as well:
WE the Delegates of the People of the State of New York . . . [d]o declare and
make known. . . . That nothing contained in the said Constitution is to be construed to prevent the Legislature of any State from passing Laws at its discretion
from time to time to divide such State into convenient Districts, and to apportion
its Representatives to and amongst such Districts.
Id.; see also 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 301–02.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 246 (“That Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for senators and representatives,
or either of them, except when the legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion, to prescribe the same.”).
The Rhode Island ratification instrument stated in part:
We the said delegates . . . ratify . . . .[i]n full confidence nevertheless . . . [t]hat the
Congress will not make or alter any regulation in this State, respecting the times,
places and manner of holding elections for senators or representatives, unless the
legislature of this state shall neglect, or refuse to make laws or regulations for the
purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the same; and that n
[sic] those cases, such power will only be exercised, until the legislature of this
State shall make provision in the Premises.
Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratri.asp.
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C. Observations on the Ratification Debates: The Original Understanding
With respect to other federal powers granted in the proposed
Constitution, Anti-Federalists made exaggerated claims as to the
192
But their claims about the substantive
scope of federal authority.
power granted by the Times, Places and Manner Clause were more
limited. That is, the Anti-Federalists assumed that the Clause enabled
Congress only to adopt regulations customarily associated with regulating the “manner of election”—including a few denied by the constitutional text. Anti-Federalists did not suggest that the provision
would empower Congress to tax anyone, or regulate speech or the
press, or adopt a comprehensive criminal code, or favor some religions over others, or control finances. All of their scenarios were
based on apprehensions about how Congress might manipulate the
date and place of elections, the composition of legislative districts,
the form of the vote, and the rules of decision. This strongly suggests
that all sides understood the Clause to authorize Congress to do
nothing outside the scope of accepted “manner” regulation.
This inference is supported further by other remarks made by
leading figures throughout the Founding Era. At the federal convention, James Madison characterized “times, places & manner” as
“words of great latitude,” but cited only examples of standard man193
ner-of-election rules.
During the ratification fight, Tench Coxe
cited as an example of the “Manner of holding” only the choice of vi194
va voce or secret ballot voting.
During the first session of the First
Congress, Senator William Maclay referred to the “mode” of congres195
sional voting as viva voce or by ballot.
During the same session,
192

193

194
195

For example, the Anti-Federalists portrayed the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and the General Welfare Clause, id., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, as having
very great sweep. See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, in LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 94–96 (summarizing AntiFederalist claims about the Necessary and Proper Clause); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV.
1, 30–38 (2003) (summarizing Anti-Federalist claims about the General Welfare Clause).
At the federal convention, James Madison said of what became the Times, Places and
Manner Clause:
These were words of great latitude. . . . Whether the electors should vote by ballot
or vivâ voce[sic], should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, shd [sic] all vote for all the representatives; or
all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these & many other points
would depend on the [state] Legislatures.
2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 1, at 240–41.
Tench Coxe, supra note 152, at 1145.
The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen
E. Veit eds., 1988), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 81 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1988).
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Representative Aedanus Burke unsuccessfully proposed a constitutional amendment to limit the Times, Places and Manner Clause to
196
emergencies. During the ensuing floor discussion, the only examples given of congressional power under the Clause were deciding be197
198
tween secret ballot and viva voce voting, fixing polling places, and
199
legislative districting.
The real Founding-Era debate over the Clause, therefore, was not
about whether it gave Congress unfamiliar powers. It was over three
other issues. The first was whether the Clause granted Congress
some traditional “manner” powers (over terms of office and voter and
candidate qualifications) actually denied by other provisions of the
Constitution. The second issue was whether Congress would abuse
the authority that all conceded Congress would enjoy under the
Clause: Would Congress hold elections on days convenient for all?
Would it choose polling places and draw legislative districts fairly?
Would it replace secret ballot voting with viva voce voting or majority200
victor rules with plurality rules?
The third issue was whether the Clause granted Congress authority to act in non-emergency situations. Anti-Federalists said it did.
Some Federalists thought so, some not. A limiting amendment would
have resolved this question authoritatively, and several states pro201
posed such amendments, but none was adopted. Yet in several key
states, ratification was secured only after Federalists represented that
the Clause was limited to emergencies, and three state conventions
ratified only on the explicit understanding that the Clause was so li202
mited.
While the ratifying conventions’ resolutions of understanding are
not absolutely binding determinants of the Clause’s legal effect, those
resolutions—especially when coupled with Federalist representations
in key states such as Pennsylvania—are persuasive evidence of how
196
197

198
199
200

201
202

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 768 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
Id. at 798 (quoting Rep. Elbridge Gerry). Another example: Richard Symmes, a young
Massachusetts lawyer (and a moderate Anti-Federalist who eventually voted for the Constitution in his state’s ratifying convention), thought of “manner” mostly in terms of viva
voce or secret ballot voting. Letter from William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr., supra
note 129, at 110.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 799 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting Rep. Elbridge Gerry).
Id. at 801 (quoting Rep. Thomas Tudor Tucker).
E.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 60 (reporting remarks by William Davie at the
North Carolina ratifying convention: “At present, the manner of electing is different in
different states. Some elect by ballot, and others viva voce. It will be more convenient to
have the manner uniform in all the states”).
Supra notes 177–183.
Supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
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the Clause should be construed. Indeed, the Supreme Court often
considers such evidence in deciding whether to interpret a provision
203
narrowly or broadly. In the case of the Times, Places and Manner
Clause, many of the leading Founders—Federalists and AntiFederalists alike—were gravely concerned about the danger that a
self-dealing Congress might abuse its “manner of election” power. In
response, leading Federalists represented that the power could not be
used except in cases of serious need. If not for such representations,
the Constitution may never have been ratified. Of course, others may
point out that the “emergency only” rule was never formally written
into the Constitution, presumably because some people thought it
was undesirable and others thought the ratification-era understanding made it unnecessary. Perhaps the best way to balance these concerns is not to apply a literal “emergencies only” limitation, but to
construe the grant of congressional authority narrowly, so that doubts
as to the scope of the power are resolved against coverage. That certainly was the least for which the skeptical ratifiers bargained.
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN “MANNER” LEGISLATION
Historical evidence does not always offer clear guidance on the
constitutionality of modern legislation, but in this case, it does. The
Times, Places and Manner Clause gave Congress authority to regulate
the manner of election within the widely accepted meaning of that
concept, excepting only the qualifications of electors and candidates,
the terms of office, and the places for electing Senators. The grant of
power to set “Times” enabled Congress to establish the dates and
hours for federal elections. The grant of power to determine “Places”
authorized Congress to fix the locations for voting for Representatives and the contours of congressional districts. The “Manner of
holding” grant bestowed the residuum of manner-of-election regula204
tion. It conferred authority over voter registration, appointment

203

204

Thus, the Court interprets the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
more broadly in cases of race than in other sorts of cases because that Amendment’s ratification history shows that its core purpose was to assure racial equality. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 695 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing justifications for strict scrutiny analysis of race classifications). Similarly, the
Court has developed the “dormant commerce clause” branch of Commerce Clause interpretation because of the historical purposes behind the Commerce Clause and allied
provisions. Id. at 421–22 (discussing the Framers’ intent to “prevent state laws that interfered with interstate commerce” as justification for the dormant commerce clause).
E.g., The Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (imposing penalties for obstruction of voting rights and allowing use of military force to enforce the law).
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205

and qualifications of election administrators, delineation of the
206
form of the ballot and the method of voting, notices and deadlines,
rules of decision (majority or plurality), procedures for resolving con207
tests, and punishment of crimes in election administration.
The
“Manner of holding” grant further authorized regulation of two-tier
election procedures, which surely included governance of primary as
208
well as general elections.
209
Authority over the normal conduct of political campaigns was
outside the accepted scope of “manner-of-election” regulation. As
such, that authority was outside the power literally conferred by the
Times, Places and Manner Clause. Congress could regulate campaigns, therefore, only if campaign regulation qualified as an incidental power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Then, as now, campaigns affected elections. Under the law of the
time, however, for a power to qualify as incidental required more
than an effect or other factual connection between the incidental
and principal power. The law also required that the putative incident
210
be less (in the language of the day) “worthy” than the principal.
In
other words, regulation of the outside activity had to be less important—less socially or economically significant—than regulation of the
principal activity. Moreover, the agent claiming a power was incidental had to demonstrate either that the lesser power was a customary
way of carrying out the principal power or, alternatively, that inability
to exercise the incidental power would result in great prejudice to the
211
exercise of the principal power. These requirements served the ultimate purpose of assuring that the claimed incident was within the
205
206

207
208

209
210

211

E.g., The Force Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (banning the use of terror, force, or bribery to prevent citizens from voting).
E.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 36, and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring states to replace
punch card and lever voting and imposing federal standards for voting systems and instructions).
E.g., ch. 114, 16 Stat. at 433.
Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315–21 (1941) (upholding such regulations).
There is an irony here: By far the Supreme Court’s most thorough analysis of the Founding-Era meaning of the Times, Places and Manner Clause is Justice McReynold’s opinion
in Newberry. Yet because the opinion did not examine contemporaneous usages of the
term “manner of election,” it reached the wrong conclusion (i.e., holding that Congress
could not regulate federal primary elections).
The normal conduct of political campaigns was not understood to include corrupting the
election machinery by direct bribery of voters or election officials. See supra note 73.
The discussion in this part generally follows the discussion in Robert G. Natelson, The
Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 1, at
52–83.
Id. at 61.
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212

actual or presumed intent of the grantors.
Founding-Era lawyers
sometimes summed these requirements by saying that an incident
could not be a “different thing” or have a “different nature” from its
principal.
Consider a hypothetical federal law altering the composition of
state legislatures. Since under the unamended Constitution state legislatures elected United States Senators, this law might affect the election of Senators; indeed, it might be designed to do so. The factual
connection, however, would not have rendered the power to pass
such a law incidental to the express power to regulate the “Manner of
holding” senatorial elections. Altering the composition of state legislatures would have been seen as a “different thing” having a “different nature” from the principal power, and thus not within the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The governance of congressional campaigns was similarly outside
213
the scope of incidental congressional power.
Governance of congressional campaigns is an endeavor at least as ambitious as (as “worthy” as) regulating election mechanics: It is a more complicated enterprise, entailing the regulation of far more resources than are
devoted to mere election administration. Furthermore, even if campaign governance were deemed less “worthy” than election administration, Founding-Era law would require a showing either of a customary connection between campaign regulation and manner-ofelection regulation or of “great prejudice” to the former from absence
of the latter. However, the eighteenth-century materials reveal no
customary or legal connection between campaign rules and mannerof-election regulation. To be sure, campaign discourse was a subject
of legal governance, but that governance was carried out through the
214
wholly separate area of defamation law —a subject the Federalists
explicitly assured the ratifying public was reserved exclusively for
state, not federal, oversight.
The absence of a customary connection thus leaves one to argue
that without the power to regulate campaigns, Congress would suffer
“great prejudice” in the administration of electoral mechanics. This
is a difficult case to make, since unfair advertising and unrestricted

212
213

214

Id. at 66, 82–83.
That is, other than by expulsion from Congress of the offending candidate. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (empowering each chamber of Congress to expel a member “with
the Concurrence of two-thirds”).
On the eighteenth-century law of defamation, see, for example, ANONYMOUS, A DIGEST
OF THE LAW CONCERNING LIBELS (W. Owen et al. eds., 1770) and 3 MATTHEW BACON, A
NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 490–98 (John Exshaw ed. 1781).
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campaign spending do not greatly impede the conduct of such operations as erecting polling booths, maintaining voter registration lists,
or counting the ballots. In any event, the ratifiers clearly informed
future generations how to resolve such questions: The power of
Congress to regulate its own elections is a power that, while necessary
to address unusual situations, nevertheless invites self-dealing and
215
abuse. In cases of doubt, it must be narrowly construed.

215

Supra text accompanying note 202.

